Turkish-Iranian Relations in the Shadow of the Arab Revolutions: A Vision of the Present & the Future
Published in: (USAK) International Strategic Research Organization & The Journal Of Turkish Weekly||Turkey-Ankara
Date: 8 & 5 July 2011
By: Ali Hussein Bakeer
Turkish-Iranian Relations in the Shadow of the Arab Revolutions: A Vision of the Present and the Future
written by
Ali Hussein Bakeer**
This article discusses the on-going regional geopolitical transformations in the wake of the Arab revolutions, and examines the impact they have had on two major regional actors: Iran and Turkey. It will look at these countries’ interests, influence and the nature and future of their relations with each other. These questions will be discussed under three headings:
• The Arab revolutions from Turkish and Iranian perspectives;
• The Arab revolutions and their impact on the interests of Turkey and Iran; and
• The impact of the revolutions on the relations between the two countries.
The Arab Revolutions from Turkish and Iranian Perspectives
Iran and Turkey each has its own vision for the region that serves its overall strategy and is consistent with its broader foreign policy direction. In this context, it is natural that the way each of these states perceives developments in the Arab world – and the outcomes of these developments – will reflect its vision, ambitions, and hopes.
Turkey’s vision is based on the idea that, even if long overdue, it is inevitable that countries in the region will orientate towards democracy. Turkey also holds that people ultimately will aspire to democracy. As such, it sees its role as that of supporting popular demands for the values that Turkey itself believes in and supports: democracy, freedom and human rights. As for the means with which to achieve this vision, Turkish policy holds that as long as there is genuine will for change, radical reform of each regime is possible. However, Turkey’s preference is that state reform happens as a response to internal popular pressure, or, if that fails, through a peaceful transition of power. Turkey does not wish to be seen as a state that violates international law, on one hand, or of not fulfilling its international obligations and responsibilities on the other. It supports this approach because it fears that international interventions would leave it with no room to manoeuvre.
Iran – as it is represented by its highest authorities: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, and parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani – considers the Arab revolutions, with the exception of Syria, to be extensions of the 1979 Iranian revolution. These revolutions are thus seen as a manifestation of an Arab Islamic awakening led by the Muslim ummah, and centred on the same values that guided the Iranian revolution, namely:
• overthrowing ‘tyrants’ and ‘agents of the west’;
• enmity towards the US and Israel;
• supporting the vulnerable and the oppressed against the ‘arrogant’ global hegemonic powers; and
• contributing to the emergence of an Islamic Middle East.
According to its statements, Iran prefers change that is brought about by the Islamic movements that have been repressed in these states – whether through insurrection or coups. It should be noted that Articles 3 and 154 of the Iranian constitution confer on the state the duty fully to ‘protect the downtrodden of the earth,’ and to ‘support the legitimate struggles of the oppressed against the arrogant in any place in the world.’
Impact of the Arab Revolutions on the Interests of Turkey and Iran
Until the outbreak of the protests in Syria, most analysts argued that the Arab revolutions would strengthen Iran’s regional position. This was on the grounds that the wave of revolutions was directed exclusively against regimes allied to the United States, and that the uprisings were taking place because these regimes had failed to confront Israel and support the Palestinian struggle.
As events developed, the diagnostic inaccuracy of this assessment became apparent. The central issue was not about an external variable related to the Palestinian cause, relations with the US, or hostility to Israel; the motives driving the uprisings – without minimising or ignoring external factors – were internal, and revolved around key demands associated with freedoms and fundamental political, economic and social rights.
The accuracy of this revised analysis became apparent when the protests reached Syria. Although we cannot assert that either Turkey or Iran has benefited from these developments at the expense of the other, this should not preclude an exploration of the implications of the Arab revolutions on the interests of these two countries. Using available data, the costs and benefits, as well as potential negative implications for each in the short, medium and long terms must be understood.
Costs and Benefits in the Short Term
The Political Level
The instability created by the Arab revolutions has undermined Turkey’s foreign policy as well as Turkey’s internal and external strategy that is based entirely on its ‘zero problems’ policy. This policy looks to achieve security and stability, and to eliminate conflict in Turkey’s regional environment. It was easy for Turkey to apply this foreign policy vision when the region was relatively stable. With the change in the regional environment, and the instability brought about by the Arab revolutions, however, we can expect that these developments will pose a foreign policy challenge for Turkey. The issue is how Turkey will adapt to the contradiction between the idealism of its foreign policy and the realism of the current situation.
Iran, on the other hand, is better able to manage the regional situation of temporary chaos that has resulted from the Arab revolutions. This is because of its experience, the tools at its disposal, and its regional allies and proxies. These factors have enabled Iran to survive similar situations and conditions in the past. Indeed, Iran has been party to such disorder in the past, capitalising on it to incentivise regional forces into negotiations, and offering concessions. In such a climate Tehran may benefit from the political vacuum that now characterises some Arab countries, and the state of confusion that has arisen and can operate as an entry point for Iran’s foreign policy. Similarly, Iran may be able to exploit this geopolitical upheaval in other areas too.
The Economic Level
In the short term, the Arab revolutions will undermine Turkey’s economic project, which is the foundational strategy around which all its other policies revolve. Instability is, after all, the primary enemy of the economy and of investment. Turkey had built its regional project on the basis of an open economy. This revitalised and new economic relationship between Turkey and the Arab world can be seen in the growth in the volume of trade between Turkey and the Arab world: from seven billion dollars in 2002 to nearly forty billion dollars in 2008. Turkish analyses project an increase in trade volumes to 100 billion dollars within a few years. Turkey hoped to achieve this through the exploitation of the strategic councils that Ankara had established with Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); the lifting of visa restrictions with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and other countries; and through common markets, the most important of which includes Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Given the current instability, and the potential that the situation may descend into a complete breakdown in governance, all of these achievements are now under threat.
The instability of the region has led to a rise in oil prices. Thus, the Arab revolutions have not only fed Tehran’s coffers with dollars, thus fuelling economic growth, but, more importantly, they have undermined international sanctions imposed on Iran. These sanctions have recently lost their substance, and Iran has been relieved of some economic pressure, while simultaneously undermining US-led collective action – which includes action from Russia, China and regional sta
المزيد
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التصنيفات :
استراتيجيا,
العرب,
ايران,
تركيا,
مقالاتي المترجمة |
السمات:
Arab Revolutions,
Arab spring,
İran ،Ali Hüseyin Bakir، ARAP، Türkiye,
Egypt,
GCC,
Hezbollah,
JTW,
Lebanon,
Palestine,
Syria,
USAK
